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Monday, May 10, 2010
1. Last Thursday, when the crisis of confidence in European sovereign debt led to a sharp dip in the markets, many emerging market economies suffered as investors fled to safety (USD, YEN). This was particularly the case in Central and Eastern Europe and East Asian economies (ex-Japan). Today, the announcement of a super-massive Euro-bailout led markets in emerging economies to rebound strongly, particularly in risky asset classes. None of this is suprising. But it does drive home the point that Greece's problems are not merely a danger to Europe, but to much of the world economy. This is particularly the case for emerging markets that are heavily-reliant on foreign financing to sustain their growth.
2. It will be interesting to see if they will act upon this realization and use Greece as leverage to push for reforms at the IMF and World Bank that would give them more say in future bail-out decisions.
3. Nassim Taleb must be giddy with glee.
4. I agree with Tyler Cowen's assessment that "[t]he major European powers would not have come up with a nearly $1 trillion bailout, also involving de facto loss of ECB independence, unless they were scared ****less."
5. In the 1920s, the expert opinion of central bankers, Treasury officials, leading newspapers and many in the financial sector was that the world must return to the gold standard. Yes, there would be painful austerity and increased unemployment, but it was inconceivable that the global economy could function without the link to gold. They were wrong: clinging to gold did more harm than good.
Now we hear from many euro-politicians and eurocrats that "It is inconceivable that Greece leaves the euro." The consequences would indeed be dire. But I fear the option is dismissed out of hand because of some mental block that prevents people from even considering the possibility. This phenomenon could be termed "euro-fetters" or the "euro-mentalité" (with apologies to Barry Eichengreen). Let's be clear: a country leaving the euro is still an option, and for Greece it may even be a desirable one.
Labels: economia, Financial Architecture, Politique, The Fourth Estate