"Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in the Defense Department's budget, in its bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in Congress. My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support -- including in the Pentagon -- for the capabilities needed to win today's wars and some of their likely successors."
In an essay to be published in Foreign Affairs, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates outlines his vision for American foreign policy. I purposely say foreign policy (as opposed to military/defense policy), because Gates wants to balance the Pentagon's institutional preference for grand, high end (low probability, high impact) projects with a greater capacity to fight unconventional, low-end (high probability, low impact) conflicts. For Gates, this includes a renewed commitment to the soft power America deployed so effectively during the Cold War. He is likely the first defense secretary in history to call for the defense budget to be cut in favor of greater funding for State.
I am a big fan of Gates. His vision, pragmatism and action have all helped repair some of the damage inflicted by Donald Rumsfeld. His call for the Pentagon to confront "inescapable tradeoffs and opportunity costs" is a refreshing alternative to defense spending under the Bush administration. As a former intelligence officer and head of the CIA, he seems to posses a higher level understanding of what American power is and how it must adapt to a dynamic and complex world.
Gates doesn't dismiss high end programs and his call for "balance" doesn't imply their scrapping all together. That would be crazy. But if he is serious about developing new US defense priorities and standards, he must extend his metrics universally and tackle the most bloated, strategically questionable and institutionally embedded programs. Unfortunately, he seems to exclude one very big conventional program: the missile defense shield.
His clear desire to temper the Pentagon's institutional preference for conventional modernization programs contrasts with his public support for the US missile defense shield. I believe the location of US missile defense installations in Eastern Europe is a strategic mistake. It is also irrelevant to the "wars of today". I'm sure his robust public support for the program is in part a power play directed at Russia. After the war in Georgia, the US has little direct leverage in the region. With the EU effectively ruling out a further eastward expansion, and the incorporation of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO too explosive an issue, the missile defense shield might be America's only bargaining chip in the region.
The importance of countering Russia in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus is clear. But the US has other tools in its diplomatic arsenal, and a little backbone by the EU would go a long way towards re-balancing the power dynamics. Which brings us back to Gates. The missile defense shield is exactly the kind of program Gates wants to move the Pentagon away from. If he simply applied his own metrics to the program, its utility in fighting "today's wars" would be evident. The question is whether the opportunity costs of the program, and the strategic costs of its location in Europe, justify its position at the top of the US defense/foreign policy agenda. In my opinion, it does not. Bob Gates is a terrific defense secretary. But he is wrong on missile defense.
"Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in the Defense Department's budget, in its bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in Congress. My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support -- including in the Pentagon -- for the capabilities needed to win today's wars and some of their likely successors."
